

**PAUL TILlich AND PAUL RICŒUR ON THE
MEANING OF "PHILOSOPHICAL THEOL-
OGY" INTRODUCTION**

MICHAEL SONN

This paper examines the historical and constructive issues underlying Paul Tillich and Paul Ricœur's muted response to each other's works and critically explores the space for possible productive conversation between them.¹ The conspicuous silence between the two great thinkers is vexing because, as it is well known, Ricœur succeeded Tillich's chair as John Nuveen professor in philosophical theology at Chicago.² And beyond their common institutional affiliation and position, they also shared common interlocutors and intellectual trajectories. Both drank deeply from the well of modern German thought, indebted especially to the philosophies of Kant, Jaspers, and Heidegger, as well as the theologies of Kierkegaard, Barth, and Bultmann. Furthermore, they also seemed to understand the nature and meaning of philosophical theology in strikingly similar ways: philosophy's role in elucidating human existence, theology's task in interpreting the meaning of existence, the necessity to interpret the symbols of the Christian message in the contemporary situation, the creative re-interpretation of that tradition—all these themes are shared by Tillich and Ricœur. Yet, despite their common institutional associations and intellectual affinities, they remained largely silently on each other's works. This paper

explores their muted response to each other's thought, and to that end, it has three sections: first, there is a historical section that examines the few instances where Ricœur addresses Tillich's works (Tillich, to my knowledge, never mentions Ricœur); second, there is a constructive section where I suggest that the reason they never publicly engaged each other is due to a fundamental disagreement over the very meaning of the nature and task of philosophical theology; and third, there is a critical section that re-assesses their positions and puts them into productive conversation with each other.

I. Historical Section

When Tillich assumed the chair of Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary in 1940, he stated in his inaugural address, "Philosophical theology is the unusual name of the chair I represent. It is a name that suits me better than any other, since the boundary line between philosophy and theology is the center of my thought and work."³ Having earned doctorates in philosophy at Breslau and theology at Halle, and having already taught philosophy at Frankfurt and theology at Berlin and Leipzig, it was perhaps altogether appropriate that his new position in America was at the boundary of the two disciplines, devoted to philosophical theology.⁴ For Ricœur, too, his academic positions throughout his career are suggestive of his own views on the relationship between philosophy and theology. He first taught philosophy at Stras-

bourg, which was the only university at the time in France to have a Faculty in Protestant theology, and, when he moved to the Sorbonne, he simultaneously taught at l'Institut protestant de théologie. And when he succeeded Paul Tillich's chair as John Nuveen Professor at Chicago in philosophical theology, he found the title strange as it contradicted his own view of the separation between philosophy and theology. "My own teaching was," he states, "bizarrely entitled 'Philosophical Theology'; that was the name of Tillich's chair. What I say elsewhere about the way in which I conceive of the relations between philosophy and theology indeed contradicts the title of the chair. But no one attached any constraints to this title, which I found upon arriving at Chicago."⁵

From these brief remarks, it is clear that Tillich and Ricœur had seemingly profound differences regarding the nature and task of "philosophical theology," but whatever disagreements they may have had, they were rarely made public. To my knowledge, Tillich never once cited Ricœur's works, although he was certainly aware of his younger French contemporary because he had hosted him when he visited Chicago,⁶ and he sent him a signed copy of his third volume of *Systematic Theology*.⁷ There is no doubt that Ricœur had read Tillich, given his many personal copies of his writings, and he even directed a dissertation on his thought, which was later published and for which he wrote a laudatory preface.⁸ Furthermore, he had agreed to write a postface in 1969 to the French translation of Tillich's *Systematic Theology*, but due to the untimely passing of the editor, it did not come to pass.⁹ Despite his familiarity with Tillich's works, however, Ricœur's personal copies of his writings do not possess the copious and heavily annotated notes that other works within his canon enjoyed, such as Augustine's *Confessions*, Barth's *Dogmatics*, or Ebeling's *Word and Faith*. And Ricœur never wrote an extensive commentary or article on Tillich's thought, citing him only twice; once very briefly in an extended essay entitled "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation" (1977),¹⁰ and another time in a footnote to one of his lectures on biblical hermeneutics for his Gifford Lectures delivered in 1986.¹¹ In both instances, Ricœur delineated between a position that espouses theology as a response to a question raised by philosophy and a view with which he aligns himself that understands theology as a response to a call. From these tantalizing, but brief and undeveloped, notes, the next section aims to construct and elaborate on their fundamental differ-

ences regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology and their contested views over the very meaning of "philosophical theology."

II. Constructive Section: Paul Tillich

There is already much written on Tillich's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and I will not be attempting here either a particularly novel interpretation of that relation or setting forth a comprehensive understanding of it. Rather, given the constraints of this paper, I aim to funnel certain themes in a schematic way that will put into relief the differences he had with Ricœur. When I use the term "philosophical theology" here, I refer to Tillich's later mature works. This is for two reasons. Firstly, even as Tillich scholars have rightly traced the origins and development of his understanding of philosophy and theology back to his dissertations on Schelling,¹² it is his later works, particularly as it was formulated in his *Systematic Theology*, that have become most influential for theology. This also means that I do not attempt to speculate on how Tillich might have reworked his theological method in light of his later encounters with the history of religions through his seminars with Mircea Eliade.¹³ Secondly, and more germane to the purpose of this paper, when Ricœur speaks of Tillich's philosophical theology as a response to a question, it is a clear signal that he is referring to his later formulation of the method of correlation rather than his early articulations in *The System of the Sciences*, for instance.¹⁴ Still, insofar as Tillich was articulating his systematic theology for a quarter of a century prior to its actual publication—a point he makes in the preface to volume 1 of *Systematic Theology*—¹⁵ I will draw on relevant articles in those earlier years that support his later claims.

To understand what philosophical theology means, it is helpful to discuss first what it is not. Firstly, philosophical theology implies a theology with a philosophical character, which, in turn, implies a theology without philosophical character. From this, he distinguishes between two types of theology: philosophical theology and kerygmatic theology. Although both forms are based on the kerygma, the former explains the kerygma in close relation with philosophy, while the latter makes no explicit reference to it. Karl Barth, who Tillich frequently names to be representative of kerygmatic theology, at least acknowledged that he could not avoid philosophical concepts, language, and meth-

ods completely, and so it is to Barth's 'radical pupils' who are ostensibly the targets of Tillich's criticism here.¹⁶

Philosophical theology also implies a philosophy with a theological character, which, in turn, implies a philosophy without a theological character. Philosophy without theology, on Tillich's view, leads to either a logical positivism that does not deal with any problems that concern us or a mere epistemology or history of philosophy enumerating one opinion after another without existential basis. Thus, Tillich's account of philosophical theology rejects the extremes of what he calls theological supernaturalism, which denounces the import of philosophy, as well as philosophies that believe it to be improper to mix with theology.

So, what does Tillich *positively* mean by 'philosophical theology'? One way to address this question is to ask what does Tillich mean by the term 'philosophy' and what is theological about philosophy, and to ask, conversely, what he means by the term 'theology' and what is philosophical about theology. Regarding the former, Tillich grants that there is no generally accepted definition of philosophy;¹⁷ it can be construed, for instance, as metaphysics, as epistemology, as ethics, or as a regional science. He works around this thorny issue by suggesting a definition of philosophy that offers the widest possible meaning, for whatever the object of philosophy, it is always something that is. Thus, philosophy, in his words, is "*that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object.*"¹⁸ In short, Tillich associates philosophy with 'metaphysics', by which he means the rational inquiry into the structures of being as they appear in the human encounter with reality. He is quick to disassociate this understanding of metaphysics from common misperceptions of it that suppose a reality beyond the physical realm. Indeed, because of this, Tillich prefers to associate philosophy with ontology or what he elsewhere calls the 'original meaning of metaphysics'.¹⁹ To understand philosophy in these terms, however, makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible because as Tillich states, "whatever the relation of God, world, and man may be, it lies in the frame of being."²⁰ Furthermore, insofar as metaphysics is directed towards the structures of being, the philosopher tries to maintain a detached objectivity that does not ask the question of its own existential roots. But insofar as every human being and thus every philosophy has existential interests and passions, it implies that philosophy, whether it is ac-

knowledge or denied, whether it is implicit or explicit, has ultimate concern in its background.²¹

If the meaning of philosophy is ontology or metaphysics in the original sense, and it is theological insofar as the question it raises implies being-itself with the existential attitude of passion from ultimate concern, now we can turn to the meaning of theology and how theology is philosophical. If God is the object of theology, Tillich insists that we cannot talk about God as given directly—otherwise God would simply appear as an object beside other objects—but rather only in an indirect sense through religious symbols. In and through its symbols, the religious encounter with reality opens up the dimension of reality in which ultimacy appears. Theology then is "the conceptual interpretation, explanation, and criticism of the symbols in which a special encounter between God and man has found expression."²² The objective and subjective side of faith are interrelated; on the object-side, faith occurs always already within given religious symbols against the horizon of history and tradition, and on the subject-side, religious symbols must be interpreted in a way that adequately answers and expresses the 'existential situation.' Thus, as philosophy implies and is driven towards theology, so too, theology implies philosophy. For in order to interpret religious symbols, "theology must use concepts which are either taken directly from a metaphysical system or which have already entered the general language without normally reminding of their philosophical origin."²³ Theology presupposes a structure of expression that draws on the conceptual tools of its period such that it cannot escape the problem of the 'situation'.²⁴

Tillich's understanding of philosophical theology, then, rejects a strict conflictual view that falls into either a theological supernaturalism or a philosophical positivism. Insofar as theology cannot respond without a philosophical analysis of the human situation, theology is dependent on and requires philosophy. On the other hand, philosophy is dependent on theology because its task in pursuing the structure of being discovers a question that philosophy cannot answer. This mutual interdependence between philosophy and theology, then, accounts for why Tillich found the unusual name of his chair in 'philosophical theology' best suited for his thought and work.

Paul Ricoeur

With an understanding of Tillich's philosophical theology in hand, we can now contrast it to Ricoeur's

understanding. Ricœur expressed a discomfort with the term 'philosophical theology' and rarely mentions it in his works. Indeed, it is often noted by Ricœur scholars that he separated his philosophical writings from theological claims throughout his career. Perhaps nowhere is this dual program more explicitly enunciated than in *Oneself as Another* (1990), which, in his words, pursues an 'autonomous philosophical discourse'.²⁵ It is well-known that the original Gifford Lectures delivered in 1985-86 included two studies on biblical hermeneutics²⁶ so as to remain faithful to the founder's will for the lectures to be on 'natural theology'. They, however, were removed from *Oneself as Another* to remain faithful to the separation of philosophy and theology that Ricœur had maintained throughout his life. He writes in *Oneself as Another*,

The ten studies that make up this work assume the bracketing, conscious and resolute, of the convictions that bind me to biblical faith...I think I have presented to my readers arguments alone, which do not assume any commitment from the reader to reject, accept, or suspend anything with regard to biblical faith. It will be observed that this asceticism of the argument, which marks, I believe, all my philosophical work, leads to a type of philosophy from which the actual mention of God is absent and in which the question of God, as a philosophical question, itself remains in a suspension that could be called agnostic.²⁷

On the one hand, his philosophical writings are guarded from a crypto-theology such that philosophy retains its own autonomous validity claims, but, equally important, biblical faith is guarded from a crypto-philosophy. Ricœur puts this separation between philosophy and theology most succinctly when he was asked by an interviewer, "Would you accept being introduced as a 'Protestant philosopher'?" to which Ricœur responds, "Certainly not. But 'philosopher and Protestant', yes!"²⁸

Such a strict separation between philosophy and theology may suggest within a Tillichian analysis that Ricœur's thought leads to either a philosophy of logical positivism that does not deal with any problems that concern us or an epistemology or history of philosophy enumerating one opinion after another without existential basis. But readers of Ricœur will quickly point out that even as he enjoyed a broad engagement with the history of philosophy, that he was always concerned with using the resources of that tradition in the service of concrete thinking about human existence. Alternatively, one may con-

strue Ricœur's thought as a form of theological supra-naturalism, which denounces the import of philosophy. It can be argued - as indeed many have - that the impulse to separate philosophy and theology is grounded in Ricœur's Reformed tradition and the critical retrieval of Barthian theology in particular. Thus when Ricœur distinguishes his own position that understands theology as a response to a divine call from a Tillichian approach to theology as a response to a human question raised by philosophy, he seems to slide closer to the kerygmatic theology of Barth and away from Tillich.²⁹

Indeed, Ricœur stands with Barth in rejecting liberal theology, which argued for the appropriateness of Christianity to the modern age by seeking a rapprochement with wider culture by employing modern methods in historical studies, philosophy, and biblical criticism. If liberal theology built up and built in presuppositions of historical understanding and research that could serve as a basis for theology as a universal science, Ricœur, in agreement with Barth, argued for the priority of 'listening to the Word of God'.³⁰ Ricœur writes, "If the believer speaks of God, it is because he speaks first of the Word of God."³¹ And again, "I am in accord with the way in which Karl Barth poses the theological problem. The origin of faith lies in the solicitation of man by the object of faith."³² In other words, the central task of theology is not an answer to the anthropological or epistemological question, 'How is human knowledge of revelation possible in general?' or even to the existential question of being-itself, but rather it is listening to the Word of God spoken to this or that person. For both Barth and Ricœur, moreover, the Word of God is mediated by the 'world of the biblical text' - the written Word of God. As Mark Wallace, the first scholar to observe Ricœur's close affinity to Barth, stated, "For both thinkers, the world of the text is primarily not the Bible's *Sitz im Leben* uncovered by historical criticism, but its *Sitz im Wort* that confronts the listener as the reliable Word of God."³³ Their common concern was that extra-biblical material—Platonism, Aristotelianism, historicism, existentialism, phenomenology, general hermeneutics—would be inserted into the biblical world and become the basic framework for interpretation. Rather, both Ricœur and Barth sought to let the text speak for itself without external impositions and presuppositions.

When Ricœur distinguishes his own position that understands theology as a response to a divine call from a Tillichian approach for theology as a re-

sponse to a human question raised by philosophy, or to put this differently, the conception of theology as a listening as opposed to an answering, it is perhaps due to their seemingly stark disagreement over the very nature and meaning of philosophical theology that they rarely engaged each other's works in public. But I suggest that by critically engaging their works, there are important points of contact between these two thinkers that bring their respective understandings of philosophical theology much closer together.

III. Critical Section

To understand their approaches *simply* as a response to a human question (Tillich) or as a response to a divine call (Ricoeur) reduces their thought to one or another aspect of what is a more complex and larger picture. Tillich's method, for instance, clearly does not impose a human limitation on God's transcendence. If humans are necessarily philosophical and thus necessarily ask the meaning of existence that implies being-itself, Tillich nonetheless rejects natural religion and its circumscription and reduction of religion to human nature.³⁴ Here, he agrees with the Barthian critique that there is no human experience or knowledge of God without the revelation of God. True religion is not assimilable into or bound within human spirit, history, and culture, but is rather grounded in the Unconditioned itself. And so Tillich's philosophical theology is not simply a response to a human question, but also it is a response to a divine call. By emphasizing the aspect of Tillich's thought that insists on the priority of divine freedom and transcendence and human limitation, it brings it closer to Ricoeur's position.

Similarly, Ricoeur's philosophical theology—if that is the right term—is not simply a response to a divine call, but touches and contacts human existence. Even as he is indebted to Barth, Ricoeur can be seen to belong to the second-generation of French thinkers who sought to enlarge the role of philosophy with respect to Christian faith. Ricoeur notes, for instance, in an extended review of Roger Mehl's *La condition du philosophe chrétien* (1947), that it was "the first great book in French where the new Reformed theology confronts the vocation of philosophy and that the main interest of this book resides in that it attempts to move beyond the phase of crisis and rupture that was of the first generation of Barthians and towards a positive attitude regarding philosophy and culture precisely from a radically

Christocentric theology."³⁵ According to this second generation of Barthians, which Ricoeur himself seems to endorse, their vision of the task of theology is much more sympathetic to the aims and insights of philosophy.

On the other hand, from Ricoeur's early student days, he demonstrated an expanded understanding of philosophy beyond logical positivism and history of philosophy so as to involve concrete human existence in relation to God. In his intellectual autobiography, he notes that he wrote his master's thesis, entitled *Problem of God in Lachelier and Lagneau*, because: "I found it intellectually satisfying that thinkers so taken with rationality and so concerned with the autonomy of philosophical thinking had granted a place for the idea of God."³⁶ His first major scholarly works, which dealt with the existentialism of Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers, engaged thinkers that dealt with the 'mystery' and 'paradox' of human existence and the place for philosophy and myth. He was clearly animated by questions regarding the relationship between philosophy and Christian faith, evident in his extended review of Mehl's work. And even as Ricoeur frequently claimed the separation between philosophy and theology for much of his career, late in his life, he sought to bring them closer together. At a conference held in his honor at Chicago, for instance, he states: "Several speakers here have underlined my insistence on not mixing discourses. But now I feel freer to be attentive to the correlations and even to the unwrapping of the different fields of theology and philosophy."³⁷ And again, in another context, he claims, "I maintained the autonomy of philosophical reflection, attaching myself to what remains in the anthropological domain: What is human action? What is a person?...On the other hand, I rooted myself in a tradition which refers itself to the Jewish and Christian Scriptures that are deployed in narratives, confessions of faith, ritual practices, etc. I *always* found myself at the intersection points of these / two domains" [emphasis added].³⁸ If a retrospective approach to Ricoeur's works allows for the constructive interaction between philosophy and theology, a prospective approach through the lens of a Mehlman Barthianism permits it on historical and textual grounds. What emerges, then, is an expanded view of philosophy rooted in existence and driven to theology and a theology that not only draws from but also significantly intersects with philosophy. For throughout the arc of his career, from existentialism and phenomenology through hermeneutics to ethics

and politics, there is a parallel and overlapping move made in his theology with respect to both methods and concepts.

Conclusion

This paper suggested that the reason for Tillich and Ricoeur's noticeable silence on each other's work was due to a fundamental difference over the very meaning of philosophical theology. Through a critical comparison of Tillich and Ricoeur's thought, however, I have tried to bring them closer together: an expanded understanding of philosophy that takes seriously human existence and its implicit relation to being-itself or God, a critique of natural religion that attempts to circumscribes it within the realm of the human, and an understanding of theology as both a listening and an answer that draws from and contacts with philosophy. Thus, this paper not only offers an historical account of two discrete, but related understandings of 'philosophical theology' at Chicago in the 1960s through the 1990s, but also two distinct, but related approaches to its constructive task more generally.

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¹ For scholars who constructively relate Tillich's theology of culture with Ricoeur's hermeneutics, see, for instance, David E. Klemm, "Individuality: The Principle of Ricoeur's Mediating Philosophy and its Bearing on Theology of Culture," in *Meaning in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*, ed. David E. Klemm and William Schweiker (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 275-291; William Schweiker, "Hermeneutics, Ethics, and the Theology of Culture," in *Meaning in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*, ed. David E. Klemm and William Schweiker (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 292-313.

² The John Nuveen chair was a gift by John Nuveen Jr. in memory of his father John Nuveen Sr., who was an investment banker specializing in municipal bonds and who was extraordinarily involved in the Baptist community. Nuveen Jr. himself lived a fascinating and rich life, who had the ear of figures as disparate as Eisenhower and Stevenson, and who served on the board of trustees at Chicago and economic and political committees in Washington. According to his biographer and former Dean of the Divinity School (and former assistant to Tillich at Union Theological Seminary), Jerald Brauer, John Nu-

veen was pleased with the appointment of Tillich as the first John Nuveen Professor because "in him, Nuveen recognized a brilliant, creative mind totally dedicated to understanding and articulating the deepest insights of the Christian faith so that it addressed modern humans exactly where they lived." See Jerald C. Brauer, *John Nuveen: A Life of Service* (Chicago: Baptist Theological Union, 1997), 3. Nuveen passed away in 1968, just before Ricoeur's appointment, so it is impossible to know for certain what his impressions of the French thinker would have been.

³ Paul Tillich, "Philosophy and Theology," in *The Protestant Era*, ed. and trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 83. Originally published in *Religion in Life* 10, n.1 (1941).

⁴ Paul Tillich, *On the Boundary* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), 57-58.

⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 49.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷ At the Fonds Ricoeur in Paris, one can find his personal copy of Tillich's *Systematic Theology*, volume 3, signed by Tillich and dated to November 3, 1964.

⁸ Jocelyn Dunphy, *Paul Tillich et le symbole religieux*, preface by Paul Ricoeur (Paris: Jean-Pierre Delarge, 1977), 11-14.

⁹ Thanks to Olivier Abel for this note.

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation," in *Essays in Biblical Interpretation*, edited by Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 96-97. Originally published in *Harvard Theological Review* 70, n.1-2 (1977).

¹¹ Paul Ricoeur, "Le soi dans le miroir des Écritures," in *Amour et justice* (Paris: Éditions Point, 2008), 46.

¹² For instance, Tillich writes, "It sometimes strikes me, when I read some of my earliest writings, how much of what I believed to be a recent achievement is already explicitly or at least implicitly contained in them." Paul Tillich, "Author's Introduction," in *The Protestant Era*, ed. and trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), x-xi. See also, Paul Tillich, *My Search for Absolutes* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 36.

¹³ In an address delivered at the Tillich Memorial Service of the Divinity School held in Rockefeller Memorial Chapel at the University of Chicago, Eliade relates that in his seminars with Tillich on the history of religions, "What he was accomplishing in our unforgettable evenings was a *renewal of his own Systematic Theology*."

Mircea Eliade, "Paul Tillich and the History of Religions," in *The Future of Religions*, ed. Jerald C. Brauer (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), 33. The last public lecture that Tillich gave, entitled "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian," concluded a conference on the history of religions at the University of Chicago Divinity School on October 12, 1965. See Paul Tillich, "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian," in *The Future of Religions*, 80-94. For his writings that reflect on his experience in Japan, see Paul Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). For his lectures leading up to and following shortly after his visit, see Paul Tillich, *The Encounter of Religions and Quasi-Religions* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990).

¹⁴ In *The System of the Sciences*, philosophy is understood as a doctrine of the principle of meaning.

¹⁵ Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), vii.

¹⁶ Tillich, "Philosophy and Theology," 84.

¹⁷ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, 18.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 20, 163.

²⁰ Tillich, "Philosophy and Theology," 86.

²¹ Paul Tillich, "Relation of Metaphysics and Theology," *The Review of Metaphysics: A Philosophical Quarterly* 10, n.1 (September 1956): 59.

²² Paul Tillich, "Theology and Symbolism," in *Religious Symbolism*, ed. F. Ernest Johnson (New York: The Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1955), 108.

²³ Tillich, "Relation of Metaphysics and Theology," 61.

²⁴ Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, 6.

²⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 24.

²⁶ Both lectures can be found in Ricoeur, *Amour et justice*.

²⁷ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 24.

²⁸ Paul Ricoeur, "Paul Ricoeur: la foi du philosophe," *Le Christianisme au XXème Siècle* n.697 (July 11-24, 1999), p. 6.

²⁹ Ricoeur, "Le soi dans le miroir des Écritures," in *Amour et justice*, 46.

³⁰ Paul Ricoeur, "Le philosophe en face de la confession des péchés," *La Conscience* n.1-2 (1957): 25. See also Paul Ricoeur, "La question de l'humanisme chrétien," *Foi et vie* n.4 (July 1951): 326. Importantly, Barth begins his *Church Dogmatics* with a section entitled, "The Doctrine of the Word of God."

³¹ *Ibid.*, 25. See also Ricoeur, "La question de l'humanisme chrétien," 326.

³² Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 523.

³³ Mark Wallace, "The World of the Text: Theological Hermeneutics in the Thought of Karl Barth and Paul Ricoeur," *Union Seminary Quarterly* 41, n.1 (1986): 7.

³⁴ Paul Tillich, "Natural and Revealed Religion," *Christendom* 1 (Autumn 1935): 159.

³⁵ Paul Ricoeur, "La condition du philosophe chrétien," in *Lectures 3, Aux frontières de la philosophie* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 235.

³⁶ Paul Ricoeur, "Intellectual Autobiography," in *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 6.

³⁷ Paul Ricoeur, "Ethics and Human Capability: A Response," in *Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought*, ed. John Wall, William Schweiker, and W. David Hall (New York: Routledge, 2002), 283. See also Ricoeur, *Critique and Conviction*, 159.

³⁸ Paul Ricoeur, "Paul Ricoeur. Nous sommes responsables du périssable," *L'actualité religieuse dans le monde* n.91 (July-August 1991): 44.